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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

benefited owner(s) in accordance with the Restatement test. In such a
proceeding, a judge would apply the Restatement rule to determine
whether the planned changes pass the three-prong test.
The three-prong test requires the burdened owner to present a
prima facie case that the alteration would cause no damage under the
Restatement rule. A successful showing would shift the burden to the
benefited owner to establish damage. If the burdened owner made a
showing of no damage and the benefited owner's evidence was
insufficient to rebut, the court would enter a declaration for the
burdened owner. However, if the benefited owner successfully
demonstrated damage, the court should decline to permit the
alteration.
In evaluating damage, or the absence of damage, the trial court
must not only look at the operation of the ditch for the benefited
owner, but also at the maintenance rights associated with the ditch. In
addition, the water provided to the ditch easement owner must be of
the same quantity, quality and timing as provided under the ditch
owner's water rights and easement rights in the ditch.
Returning to the case at hand and recognizing that their opinion
identified a remedy previously not clear in law, the supreme court
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the Club's
alteration of the easement was reasonable and otherwise satisfied the
Restatement criteria. If the alterations did not meet the test, the court
must order restoration. Further, the Ranch was entitled to an order
allowing it to inspect, maintain, operate and repair the ditch easement
and water structure, irrespective of allocation of costs and burdens of
maintenance that might form part of equitable relief.
John A. He fich
CONNECTICUT
Wood v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals., 784 A.2d 354 (Conn. 2001) (holding
spring water collection, storage, and transportation is not a permitted
agricultural use within Somers Town Code 214-4).
Hillside and co-plaintiffs ("Hillside"). appealed the trial court's
decision to uphold a cease and desist order the zoning Board of
Appeals in the Town of Somers ("Board") issued following judgment
that collecting, storing, and transporting spring water for human
consumption is not a permitted agricultural use within A-i zoning
districts, pursuant to Somers Town Code provision 214-4. The court
concluded Hillside failed to prove the Board's statutory interpretation
was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of its discretion. Hillside also
claimed the court should not have decided whether the use was legally
nonconforming, because the Board failed to address such issue
initially, and, thus, the court should have remanded it to the Board.
Applying Somers zoning regulations, the appellate court's
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determination of the Board's "reasonable and rational intent" utilized
to interpret the statute, is plenary. Though Somers Town Code
provision 214-98 permitted farms on A-i zoned property, Hillside's use
was not included within provision 214-4's "agriculture," or "cultivation
of the land" definitions. The court distinguished spring water
collection because it does not require soil preparation "for the
purpose of seeding the. land or growing crops," and further, because
spring water cannot be planted, grown, or harvested, but only
collected, requiring no soil to "grow or nurture some living thing."
The court further rejected Hillside's contention that collecting
spring water qualified as an "agricultural" or "farming" use because it
entailed "harvesting any agricultural.., commodity," under General
Statutes § 1-1 (q). Unpersuaded, the court was bound by Somers Town
Code 214-4's express "agriculture" definition and could not defer to
this statutory definition.
Hillside further argued the legislature
amended General Statutes § 19a-341 to classify spring water collection
as an agricultural activity. However, the court maintained the statute
bore no relevance to "agriculture" in provision 214-4, or to applicable
zoning regulations. Rather, the statute simply states spring water
cannot be collected in a manner constituting a nuisance.
Furthermore, the court found unacceptable Hillside's contention that
the use was permitted because it took place on a farm, because it is not
an "accessory use" incident to a permitted agricultural use within 2144, but rather activity "having no relation to the farm itself."
However, the court deemed the Board failed to initially address
whether the activity was legally nonconforming. Thus, the trial court's
determination of such issue was improper, as the factual record is
insufficient for the appellate court to make its own determination.
Therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court with directions to
remand this issue to the Board. Thejudgment was otherwise affirmed.
Robert Lykos
FLORIDA
Quiles v. Boynton Beach, 802 So. 2d 397 (Fla.App. 2001) (holding the
city of Boynton Beach's decision to add fluoride to the city's potable
water supply did not violate a citizen's right to refuse medical
treatment under Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution).
The Boynton Beach City Commission voted to add fluoride to the
city's potable water supply. Jesus F. Quiles ("Quiles"), a citizen, filed a
suit against the City alleging the fluoridation measure violated his right
to refuse medical treatment under Article I, Section 23 of the Florida
Constitution. The circuit court granted the city of Boynton Beach's
("Boynton") motion to dismiss with prejudice. Quiles appealed to the
Court of Appeals of Florida, Fourth District, which affirmed the circuit

